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HFD rescue crews lacked boats and life jackets during Memorial Day flood

HOUSTON – Internal fire department records show a senior Houston Fire Department captain wrote there were not enough life jackets or rescue boats available to first responders during the Memorial Day flood and he couldn't properly communicate on his radio during the initial response.

Channel 2 Investigates has obtained 230 pages of records related to the Houston Fire Department's response to the historic Memorial Day flood, which left eight people dead.  The documents detail the most critical hours in the early morning of May 26, as Houston Fire personnel made rescue after rescue in the Meyerland area.

As daylight broke, the records show the magnitude of the flood began to emerge as rescue crews began encountering dozens of residents trapped by floodwaters pouring out of Brays Bayou.  Multiple rescue boats were in the area taking people to safety. But In the middle of one rescue attempt,  Rescue Boat 42 capsized with four civilians and two rescuers aboard, tossing everyone into the raging floodwaters.  Three of the civilians died.

A Houston Police Department helicopter helped look for the victims and located a body, washed downstream. The victim was not wearing a life jacket.

Senior HFD Capt. Wes Hurst filed an "After Action Incident Report" in which he described the rescue efforts that morning and a list of issues that hampered successful rescue efforts.

In a section of the report labeled "Incident Issues," Capt. Hurst wrote: "not enough citizen PFD's (personal flotation devices) for the amount of rescues being made by several different boats."

NOT ENOUGH BOATS TO GET THE JOB DONE

Hurst described dozens of flood victims needing to be rescued in Meyerland from homes and the METRO Park and Ride facility at Braeswood and 610. He wrote there were not enough rescue boats to get the job done.

"I requested a DC (District Chief) and several more evac boats for assistance along with HPD, but was told  by the Chief Dispatcher that these resources were unavailable. Also requested high profile vehicles for water rescues and a METRO bus for shelter, but was told the OEM (Office of Emergency Management) had yet to be established and that I could not have these resources either."

The Houston Office of Emergency Management disputes the claim made in the report that its office was not open. Spokesperson Michael Walter says the OEM was staffed and that requests for equipment came through dispatchers.  Walter sent Channel 2 Investigates this statement:

"The City of Houston Office of Emergency Management (OEM) regrets the loss of life that occurred as a result of the Memorial Day floods.  OEM stands ready 24 hours a day to assist first response agencies in the vital work they do for our community."

INCIDENT ISSUES AND CALLS FOR IMPROVEMENTS

Hurst detailed other issues that affected the response, writing:

"Unable to obtain other critical resources that were needed.

"Unsure who was in command once we arrived.

"Poor radio communications initially due to trunking."

Hurst's report also has a section labeled "Resolutions/Improvements." In that section he wrote:

"City of Houston OEM should be more prepared for sudden severe weather incidents

"OEC (Office of Emergency Communications) should assist with informing or establishing area commands

"Understand more about what causes trunking radio issues

"Purchase several more PFD's (personal flotation devices) for citizens

"Continue to train on water rescue situations and determine the capabilities of all rescue boats during swift water operations"

RESCUE BOAT 42

Channel 2 Investigates has also obtained the maintenance history of Rescue Boat 42, the boat that capsized during a high-water rescue on May 26.  Records show in August of 2014, the boat was sent for repairs after the discovery  of leaks in the boat's seams. Repair records show an outside contractor patched 10-12 leaks, but the boat still did not pass an air test. The repair record stated "Large amount of porosity on seams and fabric that is not repairable."  However, an HFD memo dated one week after the repair invoice states the leaks were minor and not enough to take the boat out of service. 

HFD maintenance logs continued to note the leaks on a weekly basis from Aug. 25, 2014, through the end of May, when the boat was destroyed in the flood.  It's not clear if the leaks had anything to do with the boat's failure. The Houston Fire Department issued this response to inquiries about these records:

"The Houston Fire Department is always looking for ways in which we can improve our response to the citizens of Houston, especially when lives are lost. The rescue operations that occurred on May 26, 2015 are currently under internal review through our recovery process, and as our policy dictates, we will comment only after all the facts and information have been thoroughly processed."  Fire Chief Terry Garrison says, "Our condolences go out to the families of the victims of the May 26 flooding. We can never bring your loved ones back, but we can and will, however, continue to learn from this incident so that it never happens again."

The Houston Professional Firefighters Association released a statement after KPRC's story that read, in part: "The men and women of the Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association have long been concerned about the issues raised in news reports tonight about fire department resources and training.

"Houston fire fighters performed extraordinarily well during the historic flooding, but saw some of our worst fears realized during rescue operations. The issues raised within our fire department have been the subject of our discussions with the city for several years. The fact is, the fire department's facilities, fleet and equipment are aging. For three years, we have urgently warned the city about continued radio system failures. We have repeatedly urged city leaders to strengthen our command and communications resources. For example, our fire department rescue teams have not had swift-water training in more than eight years.  Our list of concerns is long.  In other words, Houston fire fighters are doing more and more with less and less.

"A few weeks ago, in contract negotiations, the city asked us to fund modest pay raises with ‘operational savings' within the department. We declined and walked away from the negotiations. In our view, too many corners already have been cut in the fire department budget – from our suicide prevention program (which was recently reinstated after being cut two years ago) to other training programs and equipment. The contract negotiations raised larger questions about the city's commitment to public safety.

"We now know that too many elected officials support us at parades and at memorials and then cannot be relied upon at City Hall to understand and fulfill their public safety obligations. Without action soon, city leaders can be assured that they will leave HFD, its people and the safety of the public in far worse shape than they found them. When the Council is finally ready to address the public safety challenges facing our department and city, we will be waiting. Until then, Houston fire fighters will continue to deliver excellent service, be good stewards of city resources, and give back in the community."

Investigative Reporter Jace Larson will continue to follow this story and post any new updates. If you have a tip for him, send him an email at jlarson@kprc.com or text him at 832-493-3951.


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